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I. Independence of Constitutional Court as an Institution  
Bosnia and Herzegovina has a specific constitutional and legal system. The 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a part (Annex 4) of the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, more popularly known as the 
Dayton Peace Accords. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into force on 14 
December 1995. 
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established for the first time 
on 15 February 1964 pursuant to the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia from 1963. The current Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is 
regulated under Article VI of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has little 
resemblance to the former Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other words, 
the new ‘Dayton Constitution’ itself has brought a completely new organisation of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina was established after the selection and appointment procedures had been 
conducted, i.e. at the time when the first session of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was convened in May 1997. 
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, reinforced by the power of the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has a special place in the constitutional and legal 
system of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a 
constitutional organ1 regulated under Article VI of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Constitutional 
Court is detached from the system of tripartite division of powers. Accordingly, the 
Constitutional Court is neither a part of legislative or executive or regular judicial power, 
which means that it has a special power granted under the Constitution and, based on the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Constitutional Court functions as a correction 
factor for other three segments of power. Thus, the influence of a legislative body on the 
constitutional and legal position of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
limited because changing and amending the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the 
only legislative manner in which the Constitutional Court may be granted a different position. 
The legislative authority may not issue a general legal act which, in the hierarchy of 
normative legal acts, is lower than the Constitution and thus regulate the issues essential for 
the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular when those issues concern 
its competencies.2  
Due to the fact that there was no constitutional basis for regulating the procedure and 
organisation of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Constitutional Court 
itself, in its “rules of procedure”, currently entitled Rules3, governs, in a very extensive 
                                               
1 The Constitutional Court does not make such categorization of the state authorities. Instead, the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina itself assigns these attributes not only to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina but also to other organs under the Constitution (Case U 6/06 of 29 March 2008, paragraph 28).  
2 Thus, in Case U 66/02 (of 30 January 2004; available at: www.ustavnisud.ba), the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina rejected the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for resolution of dispute between this Ministry and the Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the basis of Article 31 of the Law on Citizenship of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(“Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, No. 43/01) for the reason that the 
aforementioned Ministry is not authorised to initiate “a dispute between organs of State” within the meaning of 
Article VI.3(a) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
3 Pursuant to Article VI.3(a) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Court shall adopt the Rules of 
the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina by a majority of all members. The first Rules of the Procedure were 
adopted in 1997 (“Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 2/97”) and were amended for several times 
(“Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nos. 16/99, 20/99, 26/01, 6/02 and 1/04”). The revised version 
was published twice, in 1999 and 2004 (“Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nos. 24/99 and 2/04”). 
Subsequently, in 2005, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Rules of the 
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manner, the constitutional and legal tasks under Article VI of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In view of the aforesaid, one may refer to dualistic model of the BiH judiciary. 
Certain structures of the so-called unique model are recognisable only in connection with the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, as a 
reviewing court in individual cases, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
pursuant to Article VI(3)(b) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, deals only with 
issues under the Constitution. However, ordinary courts are also called upon to interpret and 
apply the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only authority competent to establish whether a 
general legal act is inconsistent with the Constitution and, if so, to render it ineffective.4 In 
Article 1 of the Rules it is stipulated that “according to the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina […], the Rules shall govern […] the organization of the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina […], the proceedings before the Constitutional Court and other 
issues relevant for the activities of the Constitutional Court.” In Article 2 of the Rules it is 
stipulated that “the Constitutional Court […], shall be autonomous and independent of all 
other bodies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. No body in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall enact 
laws, other regulations and general acts that concern the activities of the Constitutional Court 
and its role prescribed by the Constitution.” 
Article 3 paragraph 2 stipulates that “the organization and functioning of the 
Constitutional Court shall be based on the principle of financial independence. The 
Constitutional Court shall be independent in allocating approved funds from the Budget of the 
institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to its annual budget and Law on Execution of 
the Budget.” The financial independence and autonomy of the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly when viewed in connection with the constitutional and 
legal principle of separation of powers, is well explained in the case-law of the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, in Case U 6/06 (of 29 March 2008), the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina considered the request for review of the 
constitutionality of the State Law on Salaries and Other Remunerations in Judicial and 
Prosecutorial Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Official Gazette of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, No. 90/05”), whereby the salaries of Judges of the Constitutional Court of 
                                                                                                                                                   
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 60/05”) 
which resulted in the cessation of application of the Rules of Procedure. In the meantime, the Rules were 
amended for several times (“Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nos. 64/08 and 51/09”). 
4 Compare, U 106/03 of 27 April 2004, paragraph 33. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina were determined and, at the same time, reduced. The Constitutional 
Court noted that the Parliamentary Assembly “shall decide upon the sources and amounts of 
revenues for the operations of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and international 
obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which also includes the Constitutional Court” 
(paragraph 25). However, the Constitutional Court emphasized that “the principle of the rule 
of law and the independence of judiciary, as its inseparable part, and, in particular, the 
principle of the separation of powers, by no means imply that the legislator cannot regulate 
the issues important for functioning of the state institutions, even when relating to the 
Constitutional Court […]. An opposite interpretation would be contrary to the rule of law, 
which also entails an exclusion of wide margin of appreciation by the state authorities, and 
equality before the law for all citizens, and, consequently, it would be contrary to the principle 
of separation of powers, which entails the existence of the mechanisms of mutual control over 
the authorities and of a balance of powers” (paragraph 26). Furthermore, the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded:   
27. The Constitutional Court holds that the independence of the Constitutional Court constitutes a principle 
which must be secured by the legislator, taking account of the special position and role of the Constitutional 
Court in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Constitutional Court finds it necessary to emphasize 
that this implies full financial independence reflected in autonomous planning and proposal of court budget, as 
well as in autonomous allocation of approved budget, which amount must be subject to appropriate control of a 
competent authority. 
[…] 
29. […] The Constitution establishes the Presidency, the Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Central 
Bank and the Constitutional Court as constitutional bodies. It confers to the latter the general task to “uphold the 
Constitution” (Article VI(3) as well as wide competencies of control of constitutionality. These functions which 
are exercised vis-à-vis the other constitutional bodies, particularly vis-à-vis the legislator, and which are 
reflected in the final and binding decisions with regard to all public authorities, clearly imply solid guarantees of 
independence and autonomy of Constitutional Court. It is therefore that in this way the Constitution of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina prescribes the election of judges by Parliament and provides for the adoption by the 
Constitutional Court of its own rules (Art. VI(2) (b)) If it does not go further into specifying those guarantees, it 
is nonetheless clear that in this regard it refers to the European tradition and aims at rendering the Constitutional 
Court fully independent. This conclusion asserts itself very particularly in the institutional context of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, marked by the predominance of the Entities and the relative weakness of the central State. The 
central institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the integrity of its Constitution would be jeopardized without 
a strong and independent Constitutional Court. 
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30. The independence of the Constitutional Court implies that it is governed by specific rules which are 
also imposed on the legislator; and these rules should therefore have a constitutional value. In the absence of 
constitutional laws, the Constitutional Court must be able to decide independently on its internal organization 
and functioning. The Parliamentary Assembly has the power to establish the budget of the institutions of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, but it can do this only in compliance with the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina obliges the legislator not to infringe upon the independence of the 
Constitutional Court. The fact that the challenged law was adopted as such shows the extent to which the 
Constitutional Court needs to be protected from pressures which may be exercised by other public authorities. As 
stated above, the respect for the financial independence of the Constitutional Court requires as a minimum that 
the Constitutional Court proposes its own budget and the manner of use of its own budget to the Parliamentary 
Assembly to adopt it.  
Pursuant to Article 80 paragraph 1 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Constitutional Court, in addition to the performance of its functions in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, decides on “the internal organization of 
the Constitutional Court and the Secretariat of the Constitutional Court” (item 3) and status 
issues of the Secretary General of the Constitutional Court, the Registrar, Head of the Office 
of the President, the Assistant Secretary General of the Constitutional Court, the legal advisor 
to a judge and a legal advisor to the President of the Constitutional Court for international 
relations” (item 5). Pursuant to Article 105 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina established a special 
Commission for Administrative Affairs, which shall supervise and analyze the organization of 
the work of the Constitutional Court, prepare the proposal of the financial plan and annual 
financial statement and make proposals and deliver opinions for resolving other issues 
relating to the judges, the Secretary General of the Constitutional Court and persons who are 
appointed and dismissed by the Constitutional Court” (Article 107). The administrative 
autonomy, particularly concerning the appointment and management of the personnel of the 
Constitutional Court, is incorporated in internal act titled “Decision on the Organisation of the 
Secretariat of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.  
Another element of the independence of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is reflected in the fact that it is the only authority competent to remove a Judge 
of the Constitutional Court from his/her office. Pursuant to Article VI(1)(c) of the 
Constitution “the term of judges initially appointed shall be five years, unless they resign or 
are removed for cause by consensus of the other judges”. Pursuant to Article 101 of the Rules 
of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Judge may be dismissed from office 
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before the end of his/her term and the body which elected that judge shall be informed 
accordingly.  
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina recently conducted proceedings 
concerning dismissal from office of a judge of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (the extraordinary plenary session held on 8 May 2010). Pursuant to Article 
VI(1)(c) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 101 paragraph 1 line 5 of 
the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the concerned judge was 
dismissed from office for “deliberately undermining the reputation and dignity of the 
Constitutional Curt of Bosnia and Herzegovina and dignity of a judge“. These proceedings 
were the proof that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina enjoys but also 
protects its autonomy and independence effectively. However, in the end of its decision, the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has emphasized that “it will have to bear the 
consequences of the aforementioned actions of Judge […] for a long time and that it will have 
to make an extra effort to regain the undermined confidence of the public and public 
authorities in its autonomy, independence, impartiality and professionalism”.  
A further aspect of the issue of autonomy and independence of the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the enforcement of its decisions by the competent 
authorities. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina stipulates that “decisions of the 
Constitutional Court shall be final and binding”. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina thereby has the right to take all appropriate and necessary measures in order for 
the Court’s decisions to be complied with. The issue of enforceability is further specified in 
the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Articles 74 through 76). All 
authorities are obliged, within the scope of their competence determined by the Constitution 
and law, to enforce decisions of the Constitutional Court. Anyone who has a legal interest 
may request the enforcement of decisions of the Constitutional Court. The authority which is 
obliged to enforce a decision of the Constitutional Court within the given time limit is obliged 
to submit information about the taken measures to enforce the decision of the Constitutional 
Court, as determined in the Court’s decision. In case of failure to comply with the Court’s 
decision, the Constitutional Court issues a ruling wherein it establishes that the decision of the 
Constitutional Court has not been enforced and it may determine the manner of enforcement 
of the decision. This ruling shall be transmitted to the competent prosecutor or another body 
competent to enforce the decision, as designated by the Constitutional Court (Article 74). In 
addition to this, the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official Gazette of Bosnia 
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and Herzegovina Nos. 3/03, 32/03, 37/03, 54/04, 61/04, 30/05, 53/06, 55/06, 32/07, 8/10), in 
Article 239, prescribes the criminal responsibility of an official person in the institutions of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, institutions of the Entities and institutions of the Brčko District of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, who refuses to enforce the final and enforceable decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina or who prevents enforcement of such a 
decision, or who prevents the enforcement of the decision in some other way. After 
considering the enforcement of decisions in practice, the following conclusion may be made: 
Since 2001, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has made 22 decisions on the 
merits within the scope of abstract control of norms under Article VI(3)(a) and (c) of the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Out of that number, the Court found violations in 12 
cases. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately quashed the 
challenged general acts in 4 cases, and in 8 cases it gave a time limit for harmonization.5 Out 
of 8, 6 cases related to the harmonization of unconstitutional provisions. Out of 6, 3 decisions, 
which means 50%, had already been enforced at the moment of publication. When it comes to 
the individual constitutional complaints (the so-called appeal) under Article VI(3)(b) of the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the statistical figures seem better. In the period from 
1 January 2004 to 5 October 2010, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
received 23 447 cases. During the same period, out of 4280 decided, 1323 cases were decided 
by making decisions on the merits (whereas out of 11 429, 8798 cases were declared 
inadmissible). Out of 1323, the Court found violations in 669 cases. According to the official 
statistical data relating to the aforementioned period, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina issued 49 rulings on the failure to enforce decisions. Therefore, the percentage of 
failure to enforce decisions is cca. 7%. 
 Despite a relative success in the enforcement of decisions of the Constitutional Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an enormous influx of cases, on the one hand, and limited 
institutional capacities of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other 
hand, have an impact on independency and autonomy of the Constitutional Court. For 
instance, during the first three years of its work (from 1997 to 2000), the Constitutional Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina received a total number of 211 cases, whereas in the first 10 
months alone of 2010, it received 4247 cases. However, the competent legislator is not fully 
aware of the Constitutional Court’s need to develop its capacities (personnel, technical and 
financial) in order to be capable of facing new challenges. This means that the Constitutional 
                                               
5 Article 63 paragraph 4 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has to work on increasing its output continuously, which is 
limited. The consequences of such developments might be unfavorable such as, for instance, 
the need of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to make a compromise 
between the quality and quantity of its decisions, or between the priority and principle method 
of its work, increase in the average time necessary for resolving a case etc. All the 
aforementioned undermines the reputation of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the eyes of the general public but also in the eyes of the public authorities and 
creates tensions in their mutual relations.  
 The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina makes sure that its work is 
recognized in the public. Article 11 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina stipulates that the work of the Court shall be public and transparent. Specifically, 
this means that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina must inform the public 
about the preparations and holding of the sessions of the Constitutional Court and public 
hearings before the Constitutional Court, provide information as to the course of the 
proceedings, issue press releases to the media, hold press conferences, publish decisions 
taken, issue publications important to the general public and experts etc. 
 In principle, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is satisfied with the 
attitude of the public, particularly the media, towards the Court. However, there are two 
groups of problems with which the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
facing continuously. On one hand, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina notes 
that there is a certain lack of professionalism in journalism when it comes to matter the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina deals with. In particular, decisions are often 
interpreted erroneously or superficially in the media, or the media does not follow at all the 
work of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The initiative to follow the work 
of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina comes constantly from the Court. This 
is the reason why the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has the intention to 
conduct a special procedure of training, certification and accreditation of journalists relating 
to the work of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is exposed to pressure or incorrect 
disapprovals coming from the media insofar as the decisions with political implications are 
concerned, since one can sense an open partiality to certain parties to the proceedings coming 
from the media. The media reports are often nothing but the one-sided understanding of 
certain problems. In both cases, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is forced 
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to issue official denials or additional explanations in order for the public to have correct and 
full information.  
One should not forget that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
operates in the post-war period and period of transition of the State and society. The 
confidence of the public in the Constitutional Court reinforces its independence, as the 
positive voice of the public protects the Court against attacks coming from other branches of 
power or other courts. Finally, a positive response to the work and activities of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has an influence on the respect and 
enforcement of its decisions. The best illustrative example of the confidence of the public in 
the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the fact that citizens often make public 
statement that “they will go all the way to the Constitutional Court is order to exercise their 
rights”, comparing to the previous years when such statements related to the European Court 
of Human Rights. 
II. Constitutional Independence of Judges 
The basic procedure for electing judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is regulated by the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A specific 
composition of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on the fact that 
in addition to six (6) national judges, there are three (3) international judges (for the time 
being) under Article VI(1)(b) and (d) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who are 
not selected by the national authorities but by the President of the European Court of Human 
Rights. However, before the selection, the President of the European Court of Human Rights 
must consult with the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The national judges are elected 
in accordance with the territorial principle: four members shall be selected by the House of 
Representative of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and two members by the 
Assemblies of the Republika Srpska (two Entities which Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
composed of - Article I.3 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The appointment of 
international judges to the highest court of the State may be explained by the fact that the 
framer of the Constitution estimated that this Court would be very important in difficult post-
war period. 
When it comes to the election of judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, what catches one’s attention first, is the fact that this procedure is not the 
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responsibility of the Entity’s legislator. The Entity legislator makes decision by simple 
majority. Given the fact that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inter alia, is 
called upon to substantially examine the work of its legislator, a certain asymmetry is present 
in the system of appointment of the judges selected by the legislator. On the one hand, the 
state legislator is subject to the control by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and, on the other hand, the state legislator does not have any influence on the composition of 
that Court through the election of judges. 
In the recent past, there were official proposals to formally involve the High Judicial 
and Prosecutorial Council in the procedure for electing the judges of the Constitutional Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a special body established by the law in 2004, whose main 
task is to ensure the preservation of independent, impartial and professional judiciary in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with its mandate as provided for by the law. The 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not give an affirmative response to the 
proposal for the several reasons: “the Constitution of BiH provided a special position for the 
Constitutional Court in the structure of State powers. According to the Constitution of BiH, 
the Constitutional Court is detached from the system of tripartite division of power. 
Therefore, the Constitutional Court is neither legislative nor executive nor ordinary judicial 
power but a special power under the Constitution of BiH being a guardian of the Constitution 
and corrective factor of all the three branches of power. It is indisputable that the 
Constitutional Court functionally and organizationally operates as an independent body of 
high authority. […]. The issues relating to the constitutional matter [such as the election of 
judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina] cannot be regulated by any 
“ordinary law” nor can they be regulated by other normative acts. [… The constitutional 
complaint] is not an ordinary legal remedy and does not transform the Constitutional Court 
into a supreme court of appeal (superrevision), nor a third or fourth-instance court. It is 
therefore obvious that the relations between the Constitutional Court and ordinary courts must 
be defined as relations of cooperation, where the Constitutional Court remains functionally 
competent to apply specific constitutional law, and the ordinary courts functionally competent 
to apply “ordinary law”.6 
                                               
6 The letter which the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Minister of Justice of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated 24 June 2010, No. K-I-45710. 
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Judges shall be distinguished jurists of high moral standing [Article VI(1)(b) of the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina]. The framer of the Constitution thereby opted for a 
“juristic” court, which corresponds to the constitutional tradition of the former Yugoslavia. 
The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not prescribe further requirements for 
election of judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina either with regards 
to the age of judges or with regards to the professional experience. Therefore, judges do not 
have to have prior judicial experience. The judges appointed after the initial appointment shall 
serve until age of 70. 
When it comes to the criteria for selecting judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a very flexible one. The fact 
that the strict criteria are not prescribed, particularly with regards to the judicial experience, 
makes the authority electing the judges flexible so that not only legal practitioners (first of all 
judges) but also members of the academic community (such as professors) and other 
distinguished jurists who need not engage in strictly legal work (lawyers, judges, 
prosecutors), have the chance to become judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Thus, a higher level of democratic thinking may be reached on the bench of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. a certain breadth of dialogue which 
jurists who have been exposed to the limitations prescribed by the substantive and procedural 
laws for years, are often lacking. On the other hand, the failure to stipulate the strict 
professional criteria (judicial practice and other practice, bar exam, etc. ) may lead to the 
degradation of criteria in respect of the highest judicial authority, particularly if the authority 
electing judges has full freedom in the election but actually does not take account of these 
standards.  
When it comes to the dismissal of the judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina the situation is different. Only the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has the competence to dismiss a judge of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina from office. Under Article VI(1)(c) of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina “a judge may be removed for cause by consensus of the other judges“. Pursuant 
to Article 101 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a judge 
may be dismissed from office before the end of his/her term and the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shall inform the authority that elected the judge concerned. The 
requirements for dismissal are as follows: 
· if he/she requests it;  
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· if he/she is sentenced to an unsuspended prison sentence for committing a criminal offence that makes him or her 
unsuitable for the office;  
· if he/she permanently loses the ability to perform his or her functions;  
· if the circumstances indicated in Article 97 of these Rules occur (incompatibility of the office of a judge of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina with other functions);7 
· if he/she fails to perform the function of a judge in accordance with Article 94 of these Rules, which provides an 
obligation of a judge to perform the function of a judge conscientiously and to uphold the reputation and dignity of 
the Constitutional Court and the reputation and dignity of a judge . 
Recently, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted a procedure 
of dismissal of one of the judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Extraordinary Plenary Session of 8 May 2010) for undermining the reputation and dignity of 
the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the dignity of a judge. The 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina requires its judges to display a high degree of 
professionalism, independence and impartiality. The reason for this caution and high standard 
set for judges is best exemplified by the very reasoning of the Decision on dismissal dated 8 
May 2010, which reads that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina “operates in 
highly complex legal and political circumstances. At this stage of the constitutional 
development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the role of the Constitutional Court is very 
important and difficult while, objectively, its decisions have a significant impact on political 
processes within the state. The Constitutional Court resolves, amongst other things, 
complicated constitutional issues with far-reaching implications, often involving legislative or 
executive authorities at the state or entity level as direct participants. This very fact shows that 
there exists an undeniable public interest for the Constitutional Court to build and maintain its 
reputation, independence and impartiality and not to allow these principles to be endangered 
or violated. Otherwise, the authority of the Constitutional Court as an institution and the 
authority of its decisions shall be lost. The Judges of the Constitutional Court, as the 
distinguished jurists of the highest moral standing, must be aware of these principles at any 
given moment” (paragraph 56). 
The judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall serve until 
age of 70. This provision, undoubtedly, provides a guarantee to the judges to be free, 
                                               
7 Article 97 stipulates the following incompatibilities of the office of a judge of the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina with other functions: membership in a political party or a political organization in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; membership in a legislative, executive and other judicial authority in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or the Entities; any other position which could affect the impartiality of the judge. The judges 
cannot be members of an administrative or supervisory committee of public or private companies or other legal 
persons. A university professor (assistant professor, full-time or associate professor) of law elected as a judge of 
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independent and impartial in their work, without fear that the authority electing them will 
“punish” them because of their work. The guarantee of a long tenure combined with the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to dismiss 
judges from office contribute all the more so to the independence of judges. Indeed, there is 
always a danger that the judges “get lulled into” at their positions,8 however, the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not had such experiences. What is more, 
the actual work results show the opposite. By accumulating knowledge and experience at the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina the judges have a possibility to genuinely 
understand the actual needs of the institution, and to meet those needs in the best way 
possible. An additional reason for such a decision of the Constitution-maker when it comes to 
the mandate of the judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the fact 
that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in every sense of the word, constitutes a 
kind of a legal novum, which is why the work experience acquired at the Constitutional Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina ought to be appreciated and made use of. To recall, the new, 
Dayton Constitution has brought with it, inter alia, not only new constitutional organization 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also a completely new Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, with new jurisdictions, procedures and substantive grounds for decision-
making.  
Article 97 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
stipulates that the judges of this court shall not be active in some other areas 
(incompatibility): membership in a political party or a political organization in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; membership in a legislative, executive and other judicial authority in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina or the Entities; any other position which may affect the impartiality of the 
judge. The judges cannot be members of an administrative or supervisory committee of public 
or private companies or other legal persons. A university professor (assistant professor, full-
time or associate professor) of law elected as a judge of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina may, on a reduced scale, continue to teach and work at the university as a 
professor of law. 
The issue of the immunity of judges is regulated by the Rules of the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Article 99 prescribes that a judge, in exercising his or her 
                                                                                                                                                   
the Constitutional Court may, on a reduced scale, continue to teach and work at the university as a professor of 
law. 
8 The German legal terminology speaks of a phenomenon “petrifaction of judges” (Versteinerungstheorie). 
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functions, shall enjoy immunity with respect to criminal or civil liability for any action taken 
within his/her office as a judge of the Constitutional Court. A judge of the Constitutional 
Court shall not be held criminally liable, detained or sentenced for an opinion expressed or a 
vote cast at the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the entitlement 
to immunity shall not prevent or postpone investigation in criminal or civil proceedings 
conducted against a judge of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to 
law. A judge of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall not be detained nor 
shall an indictment be brought against him/her without the consent given by the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The only exception happens in the event 
when he/she was caught committing a criminal offence punishable by a prison term exceeding 
five years. In that event, the competent body which imposed detention on the judge of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be obligated to inform the 
Constitutional Court immediately. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina may 
decide at the plenary session (namely in full composition of 9 judges) by the majority of votes 
that the judge of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for whom the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina approved the continuation of criminal 
proceedings and against whom the indictment was confirmed by the competent court, may be 
temporarily suspended from his/her office at the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina pending the outcome of the proceedings. In such event, that judge of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be entitled to salary. The judges at the 
plenary session of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by the majority of 
votes of all judges, by exempting from voting the judge whom criminal proceedings were 
instituted against, shall adopt a decision granting or dismissing the request for detention, or 
for the institution of the proceedings against the judge, which shall be delivered to the 
applicant. 
Financial status of the judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is, in principle, regulated by internal acts: Decision on Salaries of the President and the judges 
of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision on Remunerations and other 
Financial Rights of the President and the judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Decision on Annual Leave and Absence from Work of the President and the 
judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.9 Therefore, the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina enjoys independence when it comes to the financial status 
                                               
9 All from 2008. 
 15
of the judges of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, albeit the compliance 
with the said acts is subject to control by the competent authorities supervising the spending 
of budget funds (audit). In addition, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article 
IX.2) prohibits the decrease in the compensation for the judges of the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina during a judge’s tenure. As far as this prohibition is concerned, in its 
Decision No. U 6/06, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina emphasized “that 
economic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina may indeed require a salary adjustment for all, 
including the salaries for the persons referred to in Article IX.2 of the Constitution of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. However, such legislative action cannot be implemented without 
appropriate amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since the explicit 
provision of Article IX.2 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina prevents the 
legislator either from reducing or from allowing the possibility of reducing the salaries for the 
persons holding offices within the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, during their 
tenure” (paragraph 35). 
There were attempts in the past to limit the financial status of the judges of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the autonomy of the Constitutional Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to get the legislative body to handle this issue. In the 
mentioned Decision No. U 6/06, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
emphasized that “the independence of the Constitutional Court implies that it is governed by 
specific rules which are also imposed on the legislator. These rules should therefore be of a 
constitutional nature. In the absence of constitutional laws, the Constitutional Court must be 
able to decide independently on its internal organization and functioning. The Parliamentary 
Assembly has the power to establish the budget of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and to enact relevant laws, but it can do so only in compliance with the Constitution of BiH. 
The Constitution of BiH obliges the legislator not to infringe upon the independence of the 
Constitutional Court. […] The respect for the financial independence of the Constitutional 
Court requires as a minimum that the Constitutional Court proposes its budget and the method 
in which it plans to use it to the Parliamentary Assembly which will adopt it” (paragraph 30). 
III. Procedure before the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is markedly autonomous when it 
comes to the decision-making procedures within the scope of its jurisdiction. A minor number 
of the provisions of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina regulate the procedure before 
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this court. In the remainder, the procedure is exclusively regulated by the Rules of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina declared the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a 
constitutional category.10 No authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall enact laws, other 
regulations and general acts that concern the activities of the Constitutional Court and its role 
prescribed by the Constitution, including the procedure itself (Article 2 of the Rules). 
The Constitutional Court has been entrusted with classical constitutional jurisdiction, 
such as abstract and concrete control of constitutionality, disputes between authorities of the 
state, as well as with the appellate jurisdiction. In concrete terms, certain provisions related to 
the jurisdiction are formulated in very broad and imprecise terms, so that they leave a 
possibility for broad interpretation. First of all, the clause stated in Article VI(3)(a) of the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina “including but not limited to“ is uncommon, and it 
finally bestows upon the Constitutional Court the jurisdiction to decide any dispute that arises 
under this Constitution. To use an example, it mentions the jurisdiction with regards to (a) 
disputes between the State and the Entities relating to the constitutionality of an Entity's 
decision to establish a special parallel relationship with a neighboring state and (b) the review 
of conformity of certain provisions of the Entities’ Constitutions or laws with the Constitution 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
resolves blockages in the process of decision-making in the Parliamentary Assembly of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which arise in a situation whereby a majority of members of 
parliament from amongst one constituent people in the House of Peoples11 declares a certain 
decision of the House of Representatives destructive for the vital national interest of a 
constituent people, such an assessment is opposed by a majority of members of parliament 
from amongst another constituent people [Article IV(3)(e) of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina], and the so-called Joint Commission fails to find a compromise [Article IV(3)(f) 
of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina].  
This means that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in principle, has 
no jurisdiction to interfere with the work of a legislative authority before a certain act has 
been enacted and has gone into force. The principle regarding other forms of authority is 
similar (such as, for instance, ordinary judiciary), because the Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
                                               
10 U 6/06, ibid, paragraph 22. 
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and Herzegovina requires that all available legal remedies be exhausted, thereby offering a 
chance to the competent authorities to intervene and correct an error if they deem it necessary. 
Therefore, the constitutional protection has ex post nature. This, in a way, brings about respect 
for the principle of democracy12 which requires that a specific competence be exhausted 
before the authorities which have original competence. 
There are two exceptions to this rule. These are a concrete review of constitutionality 
and a mechanism for “the protection of vital national interest”. As to the concrete review of 
constitutionality [Article VI(3)(c) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina],13 an 
ordinary court is obliged to refer issues concerning the constitutionality of the relevant legal 
basis for the particular case if the ordinary court has a reasonable suspicion of 
unconstitutionality. Thus, a priority has been given to the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a guardian of the 
Constitution, in comparison with the ordinary courts.14 In other words, the principle of 
constitutionality has priority over the principle of legality. Nevertheless, the fact that there 
have been a few cases brought to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the 
ordinary courts supports the conclusion that the ordinary courts actually do not have a high 
regard for the priority given to the principle of constitutionality or they seem not to be aware 
of the fact that the principle of constitutionality has priority over the principle of legality.15 
As to a mechanism for “the protection of vital national interest”, the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina intervenes during the formal procedure of enacting an act in 
Parliament. However, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not make a 
decision on “constitutionality” of the act, but it decides whether the act involves vital national 
                                                                                                                                                   
11 Under Article IV(1) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the House of Peoples shall comprise 15 
Delegates, two-thirds from the Federation (including five Croats and five Bosniacs) and one-third from the 
Republika Srpska (five Serbs). 
12 Article I(2) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
13 The aforementioned Article reads: “The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction over issues referred by 
any court in Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning whether a law, on whose validity its decision depends, is 
compatible with this Constitution, with the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and its Protocols, or with the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina; or concerning the existence of or the scope of a 
general rule of public international law pertinent to the court's decision”. 
14 U 106/03 of 27 October 2004, paragraph 33. 
15 The principle of constitutionality has priority with regard to a political will of a parliamentary majority, as all 
legislative acts, which are subject to review by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, must also be 
consistent with the Constitution and the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the matter. A request for abstract review of the constitutionality may be filed, inter alia, by a 
member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which consists of three members), one fourth of 
members/delegates of any of the Houses of the Parliamentary Assembly or one fourth of members of any of the 
Houses of the Parliament of one of the Entities.  
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interests of one or more of the Peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, if so, whether there is 
a violation of the vital national interests. The further procedure of actually passing the act in 
Parliament depends on the answer to these questions (a simple majority or a qualified 
majority).  
It is also important to point out that both proceedings are initiated upon a request filed 
by a competent entity and cannot be initiated ex officio. This is essential for the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the principle of constitutional adjudication, according to 
which constitutional and judicial protection can only be activated upon a request, is thus 
complied with. This conclusion is closely related to the rules stipulating that the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall examine only those violations that are 
stated in the request/appeal (Article 32 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), and that the proceedings, in principle, shall be suspended if the applicant has 
withdrawn his/her request (Article 17, paragraph 1, item 3; Article 59 of the Rules of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is quite flexible when it regards the legal formulation of a request 
(iura novit curia) and it holds that the factual basis of a case is a much more important 
criterion of self-limitation of its actions.   
When it comes to the orders enshrined in the decisions aimed at redressing the 
unconstitutionality, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has at its disposal a 
wide range of possible measures. In general, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has to establish a violation of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
give reasons for its decision (Article 61 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). As to the (un)constitutionality of general acts, the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shall decide on the legal effect of a decision (ex tunc or ex nunc); it 
may quash the general act or some of its provisions wholly or partly. Exceptionally, the 
Constitutional Court may grant, by its decision establishing incompatibility with the 
Constitution, a time-limit for harmonization, which shall not exceed six months. If the 
established incompatibility is not removed within the aforementioned time-limit, the 
Constitutional Court shall, by a further decision, declare that the incompatible provisions 
cease to be in force (Article 63 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). As to its appellate jurisdiction, in a decision granting an appeal, the 
Constitutional Court shall quash the challenged decision and refer the case back to the court 
or to the body which made that decision, for renewed proceedings. Exceptionally, if the 
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Constitutional Court finds that an appeal is well-founded, it may, depending on the nature of 
the constitutionally established rights and fundamental freedoms, decide on the merits of a 
case and refer the decision to the competent body in order for that body to secure the 
appellant’s constitutional rights. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
established on several occasions a violation of “positive obligations” of the State and ordered 
it to take certain measures and to bring certain situations in line with the Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The past experiences of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina lead to a 
conclusion that the three branches of government (legislative, executive and judicial) 
unenthusiastically accept the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in which the incompatibility of their acts with the Constitution has been 
established. In such situations, the public authorities often openly attack the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, attempting to diminish its dignity as well as the quality of 
its decisions and its role in protecting the constitutional and legal system. This is something 
that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has to cope with continuously. 
However, the past experiences of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina show 
that detailed, thorough and quality reasoning offered in its decisions enhance the reputation of 
the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the public at large, irrespective of 
the affected party’s attacks towards the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
its disagreement with the decision.   
Before considering some other elements of constitutional and legal procedures, it is 
necessary to mention the special relationship between the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and international community operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina.16 This 
concerns the Constitutional Court’s competencies and the orders that it can issue in its 
decisions. First, one should point out that certain international-legal entities, such as the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Office of the High Representative 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, etc., exercise sovereign powers in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the Annexes 
to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those sovereign powers should be exercised 
in accordance with constitutional and legal architecture by national bodies. However, taking 
                                               
16 The notion “international community” is a common name referring to all international factors (EU, UN, 
diplomatic missions, international and supranational bodies, etc.) acting in their official capacities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
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into account a specific situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they have been transferred to the 
international factors. The competencies of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are restricted when it comes to decisions made by these international-legal 
entities, although their actions are founded on the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Annexes to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Namely, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has concluded that it concerns 
the so-called “functional duality”.17 Despite the restrictions, the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has had a significant role in protecting the constitutionality even in 
cases relating to the actions of the international community, as it issued certain number of 
decisions corroborating that the international-legal entities, irrespective of their international 
mandate and immunity, must comply with the Constitution, the constitutional order and its 
elementary values.18  
Any judge who has taken part in the deliberation of the case shall be entitled to state 
his/her opinion, concurring with or dissenting from the decision or a bare statement of dissent 
or joining a separate opinion. A separate opinion shall be reasoned and delivered in writing 
within 15 days. A separate opinion shall be annexed to the decision. This decision, together 
with the separate opinion, shall be published in official gazettes and the Bulletin of the 
Constitutional Court (Article 41 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). This is an essential component of a democracy-oriented work of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, there are no indicators as to 
whether the separate opinions have reinforced the independence of the judges as well as of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an institution.  
Pursuant to Article 29 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, information about the course of proceedings pending before the Constitutional 
Court shall be given by the President of the Constitutional Court or the Registrar of the 
Constitutional Court. No person shall have the right to request information regarding the 
Judge Rapporteur and the legal advisor assigned to the case, or any other information 
pertaining to making of the decision in the case concerned. Therefore, information about the 
name of the Judge Rapporteur is confidential and this is a vital element in the procedure. 
                                               
17 See Constitutional Court of BiH, Decision No. U-9/00 of 3 November 2000.  
18 See Constitutional Court of BiH, Decision No. AP 953/05 of 8 July 2006, as well as “Order on the 
Implementation of the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Appeal of Milorad 
Bilbija and others, No. AP 953/05 of 23 March 2007” (available at: <www.ohr.int>). 
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Experiences show that, if such information has been made public, the parties to the 
proceedings or media frequently misuse the information and try to put pressure on the Judge 
Rapporteur. Therefore, in order to protect the Judge Rapporteur as well as other Judges from 
external pressure, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina recently issued the 
following public statement: “Dealing with the cases within the scope of ordinary jurisdiction 
of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Judges have noticed that the 
appellants often try to make direct contact with them. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina points out that the Constitutional Court makes no individual but collective 
decisions and, therefore, such communication is inconsistent with the Rules of the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Any letter addressed to a Judge shall be 
opened and communicated to the Office of the Registrar of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina”.19  
The cases in which the Constitutional Court holds public hearings make an exception 
to the principle of confidentiality.20 Public hearings before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina shall be conducted only in cases where an issue relevant for making a 
decision has to be discussed in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court (Article 46 of 
the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina). At the public hearing, a 
Judge Rapporteur shall outline the facts and the disputable legal issues relevant for the 
deliberation, without stating his/her position on taking of a decision (Article 53, paragraph 1 
of the Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
                                               
19 Available at: http://www.ustavnisud.ba/bos/press/index.php?pid=4427&sta=3&pkat=125&kat=123 
 
20 Usually, the proceedings before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina are completed in closed 
deliberations. All the proceedings are adversarial in nature; this means that all parties to the proceedings are 
entitled to submit written comments and observations.   
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IV. C O N C L U S I O N 
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a guardian of the objective 
constitutional and legal order and the subjective constitutional rights and freedoms. Under the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is a special body of the highest judicial authority, and its primary jurisdiction is reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws and the compliance with the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution. Undisputedly, the position of the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is determined by the Constitution so that it is functionally and 
organizationally independent of any government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Taking into 
account that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with its 
jurisdiction, supervises all levels of government, it is above the laws in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina deals with the laws and is 
subject to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Rules enacted in accordance 
with its authority under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In order for the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be effective in 
protecting the basic objectives, including the rule of law, and to contribute to the 
harmonization of social relations and the development of democracy, it is necessary to secure 
the organisational and functional independence of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in its relationship with the legislative, executive and judicial authorities and to 
ensure that the bodies at all levels of government comply with and enforce the decisions of 
the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, irrespective of their position on a 
decision. Only in this way can the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina fulfil its 
constitutional role. Given the specific and complex constitutional and legal system in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, it will take the time to understand the special position of the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the highest institutional guardian of all values that ought 
to be afforded constitutional protection. 
